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News, analysis and action in support of justice for East Timor 
Must try 
harder 
No.52 March 2001 
Efforts to bring to justice the 
perpetrators of human rights violations 
in East Timor have got off to a slow 
start. The next session of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights 
(UNCHR), on 19 March-27 April, offers 
an opportunity to emphasise to the 
international community the urgent 
need for justice. Some lobbying points 
are listed below. Overleaf, CllR's Asia 
Policy Officer Catherine Scott reports 
on prosecutions in Indonesia and East 
Tim or. 
Now is the time for justice: A woman mourns at the cross for the Timorese killed in the 1991 
massacre at Santa Cruz cemetery. 
The UNHCR should adopt a resolution condemning gross violations of human rights in Indonesia and calling 
for perpetrators of serious human rights vio-
lations and crimes against humanity com-
mitted in Indonesia, and in East Timor 
during the Indonesian occupation, to be 
brought to speedy justice according to inter-
national standards. 
• An international tribunal should be 
established for this purpose, based on 
the recommendations of the UN Special 
Commission of Enquiry and the three 
special rapporteurs. 
• International agencies must have secure 
access to refugees, who should be 
screened and allowed to make 
uninhibited, informed choices about their 
future domicile. 
• The Indonesian goverment should 
amend its constitution to allow 
retroactive prosecution for gross 
violations of human rights. 
• The Indonesian government should 
transfer authority to establish ad hoc 
human rights courts from the parliament 
and the president to the Supreme Court 
or another respected non-political body. 
• The Indonesian government should 
adopt legislation making military 
personnel subject to civilian courts in 
criminal cases. 
• The Indonesian government should 
cooperate fully with the UN Transitional 
Authority in East Timar (UNTAET) in 
prosecuting human rights cases and 
establishing an effective witness 
protection programme, as well as 
bringing to trial in Indonesia members of 
the mil itary and militias living in 
Indonesia who have been indicted in East 
Tim or. 
• The Indonesian government should sign 
and ratify the international convenants 
on civil and political rights, and on 
economic, social and cultural rights, 
without reservations; implement in full 
covenants it has already ratified such as 
the Convention for the Elimination of all 
forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) and the Convention Against 
Torture; and harmonise its domestic laws 
with these standards. 
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Judicial system 
Justice delayed 
Western governments are exerting 
pressure on Indonesia to improve its 
judicial system in the interests of 
stability in the archipelago. But there is 
a danger that in the process the need 
for justice for the East Timorese will be 
overlooked. 
e hard-pressed Serious Crimes 
nvestigation Unit of the UN 
Transitional Authority in East Timor 
(UNTAET) has been working to indict and 
try perpetrators in the newly established 
East Timorese courts. On 24 January an 
international court in Dili sentenced a pro-
Jakarta militiaman to 12 years' 
imprisonment for murder. Joao Fernandes, 
22, (a member of the Besi Merah Putih -
'red and white iron' - militia) was found 
guilty of murdering a pro-independence 
activist in Maliana on 8 September 1999. 
His prison sentence was reduced from 20 
years after he agreed to supply further 
information about militia activities in East 
Timor in 1999. This was the first successful 
prosecution for the violence which 
surrounded the 1999 popular consultation. 
Prosecutors in East Timor, working with the 
United Nations, expect a further 15 cases to 
be heard within the next few weeks. 
In another breakthrough, on 6 February 
the UN indicted an Indonesian army officer 
and two anti-independence militia leaders 
for rape. It was the first time the UN has 
filed indictments for sexual crimes in East 
Timor. The accused allegedly detained and 
repeatedly raped three women between 
May and July 1999 in the town of Lolatoi, 
100 km south-west of Dili. 
Where are the big fish? 
So far, however, it is the small fry who face 
prosecution. Two Indonesian soldiers and 
several militiamen have been indicted. 
Despite a promise to cooperate with 
UNTAET in legal, judicial and human rights 
matters, Indonesia has refused either to 
extradite suspects to East Timor or to allow 
prosecutors from East Timor to interview 
suspects in Indonesia. UNTAET's under-
resourced human rights unit is hampered 
by lack of experience, language problems 
and a shortage of skilled translators, among 
other problems. Although there is ample 
evidence of chains of command leading 
from the militias to the Indonesian army 
(INI), it is difficult to mount a successful 
prosecution. 
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Trials in Indonesia 
The progress of criminal prosecutions in 
Indonesia for crimes relating to East Timor 
has also been desperately slow. The trials of 
six suspects for the killing of three staff of 
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) in August 2000 in West Timor 
have been delayed by a dispute over where 
the proceedings should be held. Judge Anak 
Agung Gde Dalam has now ruled that the 
trials will proceed in North Jakarta, as it 
remains unsafe to hold them in Atambua in 
WestTimor. 
In the meantime, the trial in Jakarta of 
Eurico Guterres, former commander of the 
Aitarak militia, has at times bordered on 
farce. The Portuguese ambassador to 
Indonesia, Ana Gomes, was forced to ask 
the Minister of Justice and Human Rights 
why Guterres' supporters were apparently 
permitted to swarm into the courtroom 
waving banners and flags. Guterres is now 
under house arrest. 
In response to international pressure, 
the Indonesian House of Representatives 
passed a human rights law on 6 November. 
But no one knows when, or if, the ad hoc 
human rights courts which have been 
promised for Jakarta, Medan, Surabaya and 
Ujung Pandang, will be set up, or whether 
they will try senior military officials 
suspected of masterminding violence in 
East Timor in 1999. 
Softly, softly 
The international community has 
demonstrated little political will to hold 
Indonesia accountable for the crimes of 
1999. More than a year ago, the UN 
International Commission of Enquiry and 
three UN Special Rapporteurs 
recommended that an international 
tribunal be constituted to try crimes 
against humanity and war crimes 
committed in East Timor. The UN Security 
Council decided instead to let Indonesia 
conduct its own legal process. After the 
killing of three UNHCR employees in 
August 2000, the Security Council passed 
Resolution 1319 (which demanded the 
disarming and disbanding of the militias). 
The visit of a Security Council delegation 
in November 2000 established, in the 
words of the UN secretary-general, that 
'despite the collection of some arms, 
resolution 1319 (2000) remained largely 
unfulfilled'. The delegation made few 
strong recommendations, and was careful 
to avoid antagonising the Indonesian 
government. 
With the Indonesian president 
Abdurrahman Wahid looking increasingly 
vulnerable, foreign governments are 
preoccupied with Indonesia's stability. 
When the Security Council convened to 
renew UNTAET's mandate at the end of 
January 2001, governments made only 
passing reference to justice. The Swedish 
government, speaking on behalf of the 
European Union, seemed prepared to rely 
on the Indonesian authorities: 
The European Union calls on the 
Government of Indonesia to continue 
all necessary efforts to bring the 
perpetrators of serious crimes, 
committed during the violence in 
September 1999 and before, to justice. It 
also takes note of the efforts being made 
by the Indonesian Attorney General 
concerning the investigation of human 
rights violations in East Timor, and calls 
on the Indonesian Government to 
follow the spirit of the Memorandum of 
Understanding signed with UNTAET. 
The investigation process and the 
bringing to justice of those responsible 
for the atrocities that followed the 
popular consultation must not be 
delayed. The European Union also 
encourages the Indonesian judicial 
authorities to continue the co-
operation with the office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. 
Human rights groups are aware that they 
must carefully balance the need for 
advances in Indonesia with the needs of the 
East Timorese to obtain justice. They must 
not allow one to displace the other. They 
must also redouble the pressure on 
Indonesia, directly and through their own 
governments. 
Nevertheless, human rights groups 
around the world have been highly critical 
of the softly-softly approach. East 
Timorese activists have complained that 
their people's suffering should not be used 
as a strategy to facilitate legal advances in 
Indonesia, desirable though these are. On 
the first anniversary of the report from the 
International Commission of Enquiry, 
many called for an international tribunal. 
Lastly, governments should bear in 
mind that failure to address genuine 
grievances in East Timor could ultimately 
lead to serious civil unrest, as people try to 
settle their own scores. Conflict could set 
back international efforts to put East 
Timor on the road to peace and stability. 
EAST TIMOR: Nation in waiting 
East Timor emerged into the 21st 
century having endured 400 years of 
colonial rule, followed by nearly 
quarter of a century of brutally 
repressive occupation, and finally a 
brief but devastating period of 
violence. Having chosen 
independence, the people of this 
tiny country face the multiple tasks 
that building a political, social and 
commercial infrastructure out of the 
ashes of conflict implies. 
Timor, which lies 482 km north of Darwin, Australia, was settled by Malay, Melanesian and Polynesian 
peoples before the arrival of Dutch and 
Portuguese settlers in the 16th century. 
The eastern part of the island began 
what was to be a long and traumatic 
struggle for independence in 1974, 
when Portugal began a process of 
decolonisation. 
On 11 August 1975 the Timorese 
Democratic Union (UDT} staged a coup 
to pre-empt Indonesia's threat to 
intervene should the nationalist 
liberation movement, Fretilin, come to 
power after Portugal's withdrawal. The 
ensuing civil war cost the lives of 1,500 
people and saw Fretilin take control of 
most of Portuguese Timor. 
Invasion 
Worried by the proximity of an indepen-
dent state with radical policies, in 
December 1975 Indonesia launched a 
full-scale invasion of East Timor with the 
knowledge of the United States and the 
encouragement of Australia. After a 
fraudulent 'act of self-determination' (the 
'Balibo Declaration'), in May 1976 East 
East 
Tim or 
Timor was declared to be Indonesia's 
27th Province. The United Nations 
always regarded the annexation 
as illegal. 
There followed years of determined 
resistance by the poorly armed Falintil on 
behalf of the East Timorese. It is 
estimated that some 200,000 people -
a third of the population at the time of 
the invasion - died from malnutrition, 
preventable diseases, or at the hands of 
the occupying forces. 
Under the Indonesian dictator 
Suharto, negotiations between the 
Indonesian government and Portugal -
in international law the administering 
power - became deadlocked. It was not 
until 1997-98, with financial crisis 
sweeping Asia and the final ebbing of 
international support for Suharto's 
corrupt regime, that there were real 
signs of change. 
Suharto's successor jusuf Habibie 
bowed to international pressure and, in 
essence, traded East Timor for much-
needed support from the International 
Monetary Fund. Habibie offered the East 
Timorese autonomy within Indonesia. If 
they rejected it, Indonesia would 'let East 
Timor go'. The offer was a pragmatic 
one, made by a stand-in president, and 
without wide consultation. Much of the 
Indonesian military was appalled. 
In negotiating the terms under which 
a ballot on the autonomy package would 
take place, the United Nations allowed 
Indonesia to provide the security. This 
was to prove costly, as it left the way 
open for those in the military special 
forces, . Kopassus, responsible for the 
original invasion, to try to influence the 
result or wreak revenge should they fail. 
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East Timor at a glance 
Popular Consultation 
Braving violent intimidation by 
Indonesian militia, more than 90 per 
cent of eligible East Timorese voters 
turned out, and nearly 80 per cent of 
them voted for independence. The 
United Nations had assured voters it 
would stay after the ballot. Although a 
backlash had been predicted, the 
severity of the violence that followed the 
announcement of the results took the 
world by surprise. As UN personnel fled, 
the Indonesian military and militias drove 
nearly 300,000 people over the border 
into West Timor, while killing, raping and 
looting, and laying waste to East Timor's 
long-neglected infrastructure. 
Transition 
Following an intervention by an armed 
international force (INTERFET} in 
September 1999, and with the departure 
of all Indonesian troops on 31 October, 
East Timor came under the United 
Nations Transitional Administration in 
East Timor (UNTAET} headed by Sergio 
de Mello. It was expected to take 
UNTAET two to three years to prepare 
the territory for full independence. The 
first six months of freedom were spent 
responding to a major emergency -
feeding the hungry and trying to 
facilitate the return of the hundreds of 
thousands of displaced. By December 
2000 there were still 100,000 East 
Timorese in refugee camps in West Timor 
alone. Some were displaced further afield. 
Militias were running many of the camps 
and preventing people from returning to 
East Timor. 
UNTAET inherited a country with a 
largely unemployed population and an 
economy in ruins. Key challenges include 
the search for reconciliation with justice, 
and supporting the growth of a strong 
civil society in East Timor. But the East 
Timorese are now free at last to begin 
constructing an independent nation. 
In the late 1990s, the political scene 
in East Timor came to be dominated by 
the National Council for East Timorese 
Resistance (CNRT}, a grouping of old 
anti-Indonesian parties. The CNRT is led 
by Xanana Gusmao, the 'Asian Mandela' I 
who spent most of the 1990s in jail in 
Indonesia for his part in the armed 
resistance. His popularity among the East 
Timorese, and the resilience of the 
people, will be major factors shaping the 
recovery that needs to take place at every 
level of society. 
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Implications of independence 
Election countdown begins 
On 12 December East Timor's National 
Council endorsed a calendar marking 
out the steps to independence by the 
end of the year 2001. Milena Pires 
and Catherine Scott examine the 
implications. 
The calendar, proposed by Xanana Gusmao in his capacity as leader of the Council of Timorese National 
Resistance (CNRT), provisionally sched-
uled constituent assembly elections for 
June 2001. The UN Transitional Authority 
in East Timor (UNTAET) has since 
announced that the elections will take 
place on 30 August 2001. The constituent 
assembly is expected to draw up and adopt 
the new East Timorese constitution, and 
become East Timor's first parliament. The 
calendar presumes the choice of a presi-
dential system of government, in keeping 
with a resolution adopted at the CNRT 
congress last August. 
The plan is ambitious, but the United 
Nations has accepted it as a guiding docu-
ment. The deadlines it sets will probably 
slip, and many people, both inside and 
outside East Timor, recognise that the 
process will probably need to be slower. 
Sergio Vieira de Mello, head of UNTAET, 
mentioned the calendar in a report to the 
UN Security Council in early December, 
affirming that it was the product of wide 
consultation. In fact, the National Council 
had not yet discussed it and discussion 
within the CNRT had been minimal. The 
lack of consultation led some political 
factions to criticise Gusmao for 
undemocratic and secretive behaviour. 
Further controversy was ignited by the false 
claim that the calendar set 28 November as 
independence day. This was the date of the 
original 1975 declaration of the 
Independent Republic of East Timor 
(DRET/RDTL), championed by a controver-
sial political party now operating in East 
Timor with alleged Indonesian backing. 
Although leaders of the Fretilin political 
party have individually endorsed Gusmao's 
leadership, some individuals and political 
groups feel that a presidential system, in 
particular one that concentrates too much 
Security Council extends UNTAET's mandate 
On 31 January 2001 the UN Security 
Council unanimously passed Resolution 
1338 (2001 ), extending the mandate of 
the UN Transitional Authority in East 
Timor (UNTAET) until 31 January 2002. 
The resolution is sufficiently flexible to 
take into account adjustments to the 
proposed calendar for East Timor's 
independence. It highlights the need for 
continuing delegation of tasks to the East 
Timorese, and the need for a 'strong 
international commitment' to East Timor 
after independence. It requests the UN 
secretary-general to make detailed 
recommendations on the size of the 
international presence which will be 
needed in six months time. It also reaffirms 
resolutions 1272 (1999) and 1319 (2000) 
which demanded action on the plight of 
refugees in West Timor. The resolution 
provides for UNTAET to 'respond robustly' 
to militia threats in East Timor. 
The resolution urges continued 
financial commitment from donor 
governments and better coordination of 
development assistance. It stresses that 
East Timor will continue to need help 
after independence. It draws attention to 
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the newly formed East Timorese Defence 
Force, and the need to provide it with 
financial and technical resources. 
The resolution also mentions the 
need to address shortcomings in the 
administration of justice in East Timar, in 
particular prosecuting those responsible 
for serious crimes in 1999, and the need 
for resources to develop the police force 
and judicial system. 
HIV/AIDS 
Resolution 1338 (2001) also 
acknowledges the potential problem of 
HIV/AIDS, which has not featured in 
previous UN pronouncements. The issue 
remains sensitive owing to cultural and 
religious taboos surrounding discussion 
of sex, contraception and prostitution. 
Although the Security Council resolution 
confines itself to the sensitisation of 
international personnel, airing the issue 
has been a significant step. Health 
workers point out that unless 
preventative education and action are 
taken soon, East Timar has all the 
conditions for a major epidemic a few 
years hence. 
power in the office of president, may not be 
for the best. Several critical articles iq the 
international media question aspects of 
Gusmao's role and actions. 
The problem is that many people, 
both in East Timor and outside, tend to 
equate consultation of Gusmao with con-
sultation of the East Timorese people in 
general. Even the United Nations has 
fallen into this trap. There is an urgent 
need to broaden consultation processes 
and in so doing to strengthen East 
Timorese civil society. Discussion of the 
new constitution must be as broad as pos-
sible before the constituent assembly 
comes to approve it. The burgeoning com-
munity of non-governmental organisa-
tions can assist in this process, but so 
should the local democratic structures set 
up under the Community Empowerment 
Programme. It is important that discus-
sions on the constitution go right to the 
grass roots, and that views are collected 
and channelled appropriately. 
Timar Link has documented the dissatis-
faction of the East Timorese with the inter-
national presence in East Timor. Most of the 
resources expended are unlikely, ultimately, 
to benefit East Timor and the people have 
not always been treated with the respect 
they deserve. It is not difficult to sympa-
thise with the view that the sooner UNTAET 
leaves and lets the East Timorese find their 
own way, the better for everyone. 
However, a rapid UN pull-out at the 
end of the year would also leave East Timor 
dangerously weak. Quite apart from the 
security risks - and there is plenty of evi-
dence that the Indonesian military is main-
taining the militias in West Timor for 
future destabilisation - the democratic 
institutions so necessary to East Timor's 
future need time to rise to the huge 
demands that will so soon be placed on 
them. Strong institutions are essential to 
mitigate personality politics and to develop 
collective responsibility and decision 
making. Such capacity building cannot be 
done quickly. The East Timorese foreign 
minister, Jose Ramos Horta, has spoken 
recently of waiting a little longer for inde-
pendence if circumstances demand. 
For these reasons, Timor Link welcomes 
the UN Security Council decision to main-
tain a presence in East Timor for at least 
two years after elections, to maintain 
peace and stability for the newly indepen-
dent nation (see box, left). 
Women 
Women lobby the World Bank 
Women in East Timor have organised 
quickly since the end of the Indonesian 
occupation, and in the face of male 
hostility are making themselves heard 
in key decision-making fora, says 
Catherine Scott. 
A t the World Bank donors' review meeting in Brussels in December 2000, Filomena dos Reis, 
representing the East Timorese Women's 
Network (REDE), called for : 
• resources to be made available to 
mainstream gender throughout the 
planning process towards independence; 
• women's health to be prioritised, and 
counselling provided to victims of 
sexual crimes; 
• at least 30 per cent of posts in public 
services to be allotted to women; 
• grassroots women to participate in 
politics and administration; 
• tough new laws to protect women from 
domestic violence. 
Opposition to the new role women are 
seeking is highly visible. Women have been 
stoned in the market place for wearing 
short sleeves and talking on mobile phones. 
At least four women have died as a result of 
domestic violence since autumn 1999. Men 
are trying to reassert their authority: more 
than 80 per cent are unemployed, feeling 
bitter and powerless in the face of a UN 
presence which still tends to do things for 
them rather than with them. 
Filomena dos Reis' requests received a 
promise of swift action from the head of the 
UN Transitional Authority in East Timor 
(UNTAET), Sergio Vieira de 
Mello. He agreed to meet 
representatives from women 's 
organisations back in Dili. On 
19 December he met dos Reis, 
and affirmed UNTAET's 
commitment to empowering 
women in the private and 
public sectors, but explained 
that the attitudes of men 
would also have to change if 
real progress was to be 
achieved. UNTAET, he said, is 
committed to making it clear 
to men that violence against 
women will be swiftly 
punished. 
The women argued that 
to effect cultural change, a 
strong message should be 
promoted that men will not Filomena dos Reis of the East Timorese Women's Network on a 
get away with violence recent visit to CllR's London office. 
against women. The 
education system should promote equality 
from primary level upwards. Community-
based education, radio, television and 
newspapers should also be used to spread 
the message. The administration should 
set up shelters, and safe-houses should be 
provided for women. 
De Mello explained that UNTAET has 
passed strong new special legislation 
against violence, including sexual 
violence, and this is now being applied by 
the serious crimes unit. Civilian police 
procedures will be improved so that cases 
of sexual violence are dealt with 
sensitively and speedily. Civic education 
will promote gender equity and women 
will be strongly encouraged to participate 
fully in politics and society. However, de 
Mello said, women need to put themselves 
forward for civic and public office. It is 
sometimes difficult to fill the new quotas 
because female candidates are slow to 
come forward. 
More conservative elements in East 
Timorese society - the church, for 
example - should embrace change and 
develop strategies to facilitate it. Catholic 
women's organisations have a wealth of 
experience in this, as East Timorese 
delegates to the World Union of Catholic 
Women's Organisations meeting in Rome 
this March, will discover. 
Quotas for women ,, 
REDE, East Timor's Women's Network, is 
lobbying for a quota to give women at 
least 30 per cent of seats in the Constituent 
Assembly, and for 30 per cent of candidates 
fielded by each political party in the 
assembly elections to be women (with 
women listed as every third candidate from 
the top of the list). The elections are 
provisionally set for June 2001, although 
this date may change. 
The UN Transitional Authority in East 
limor (UNTAET} Is expected to decide the 
electoral rules and procedures at the end 
Febru~ after COASidertng 
·~~~r\Cldi~ftW1r.~,Natfon· 
~AET 
does not favour quotas, alleging that they 
would detract from free and fair elections. 
There are, however, several precedents of 
elections conducted with quotas to 
encourage the election of women. Quotas 
have been used in Bosnia, India, and 
South Africa to good effect over the past 
decade. Also, numerous UN resolutions, 
documents and statements make clear the 
importance of women's full participation 
in political structures, political parties, and 
government. 
Key role 
The Constituent Assembly will play a key 
rote in framing and agreeing East Timor's 
constitution. REDE members therefore 
feel it is imperative that sufficient, and 
strong, women's voices are elected to the 
body. REDE has made its views plain to 
UNTAET and to East Timor's political 
parties, and has been encouraging 
groups internationally to support the 
campaign. 
The network believes that East 
Timorese women have been politically 
marginalised for long enough. They have 
made it clear that they want a much 
stronger voice in the new East Timor. To 
deny the quota would be to sacrifice an 
important means of ensuring women 
voice in an independ nt East Timo 
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Safety and security in refugee camps 
Time to come home 
On 6 September 2000 three staff of 
the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees were killed in Atambua. 
As a result, all UN international staff 
were withdrawn from West Timor. On 
8 September the UN Security Council 
adopted resolution 1319 (2000), which 
insisted that the government of 
Indonesia take additional steps to 
disarm and disband militias and ensure 
safety and security in the refugee 
camps. Catherine Scott reports on 
subsequent developments. 
The militias are based in refugee camps in West Timor, where large numbers of East Timorese refugees 
continue to live in very difficult condi-
tions. The militias have been intimidating 
refugees and spreading misinformation 
about the situation in East Timor. The UN 
Transitional Authority in East Timor 
(UNTAET) has attempted to counter this 
by disseminating factual information 
about East Timor and arranging for 
Indonesian journalists based in West 
Timor to visit Dili. 
In a report to the Security Council in 
January 2001 on the situation of refugees 
in West Timor, UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan said: 'There are no indications of 
tangible progress in disbanding the 
militias and enabling the refugees to 
decide freely whether to return to their 
homes or to resettle in Indonesia.' A 
Security Council mission to East Timor 
and Indonesia in November 2000 had 
discovered that apart from the collection 
of some arms, resolution 1319 (2000) 
remained 'largely unfulfilled'. 
The Indonesian authorities met with 
UNTAET in Denpasar, Indonesia, on 30 
November with a view to implementing 
an agreement on a joint border committee 
that had been signed on 14 September. 
The UN Security Council has kept up 
the pressure. On 6 December it adopted a 
presidential statement (S/PRST /2000/39) 
which demanded that the government of 
Indonesia take decisive action to end the 
militia activities, allow international relief 
agencies to return to West Timor and 
improve the flow of information to 
refugees. To ensure the security of the 
international personnel, the Security 
Council urged discussions between the 
Indonesian government and the United 
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Nations to facilitate an expert assessment 
of the security situation in West Timar. On 
22 December the Indonesian government 
met the UN resident coordinator in Jakarta 
to discuss a mission to assess security 
conditions. 
Reconciliation 
In October 2000 divisions emerged within 
the pro-autonomy umbrella group, and 
between the militias and the Indonesian 
military. Eight militia leaders announced 
that they were prepared to return to East 
Timor to face justice, and claimed that 
thousands of refugees would follow them 
if their security were assured. UNTAET has 
encouraged reconciliation efforts between 
CNRT and pro-Indonesian militias. In 
December East Timorese community 
leaders met pro-autonomy supporters in 
Denpasar; the meeting was arranged with 
the help of the Indonesian authorities. 
The UN secretary-general reported that in 
December, 400 East Timorese former 
reservists of the Indonesian armed forces 
returned with their families to Lautem and 
Viqueque districts in East Timor. Over the 
Christmas holiday some 250 refugees 
visited East Timor. Efforts are under way, 
in collaboration with the Indonesian army 
and the Government of Indonesia Task 
Force for Refugees to arrange further 
exploratory visits by militia leaders in 
early 2001. 
Although militia incursions into East 
Timar have decreased in recent months, 
the threat will remain until the 
Indonesian government disbands the 
militias. The refugee problem will also 
remain. The United Nations continues to 
press the Indonesian government to fulfill 
resolution 1319. 
Numbers game 
Although officials in West Timor claim 
that 130,000 refugees remain there, East 
Timor's foreign minister, Jose Ramos 
Horta, believes there are only 60-70,000. It 
has been suggested that the refugees have 
become a financial investment for the 
military authorities in West Timar and for 
the indigenous population, who take 
advantage of food aid. Refugee numbers 
appear to rise and fall: the Indonesian 
Observer reported on 30 October that 
'there are 60,000 Timorese refugees in 
Belu, but wherever there is rice 
distribution, over 250,000 turn up to 
receive supplies' . Apparently shelters built 
for refugees were snapped up by locals 
instead. They were then burnt down by 
refugees, strengthening the view among 
many West Timorese that it is time for the 
East Timorese to leave. 
The Indonesian government has been 
calling for the release of funds to resettle 
those refugees who want to remain in 
Indonesia. It has also promised that the 
pensions of former civil servants of the 
Indonesian regime in East Timor will be 
unfrozen, and the beneficiaries will receive 
payments. This may encourage the return 
to East Timor of some refugees who feared 
losing their pension rights. The 
Indonesian government has also been 
campaigning for the international 
agencies to resume operations in West 
Timor. Another date has been set for 
registration of the refugees, in March 
2001. Indonesia knows that the process 
must be transparent and above board, and 
has opened the process to 12 international 
observers. 
New Comment from CllR 
East Timor - Transition to statehood 
After 24 years of repression at the hands 
of the Indonesian military, the people of 
East nmor stand on the brink of 
independence. 
This Comment traces their painful 
journey to freedom and sets out the key 
challenges facing the world's newest 
country. 
On top of a legacy of corrupt military 
rule, East Timor inherits an infrastructure 
laid waste by the violence of 1999, a 
shattered economy and chronic poverty. 
Its women, for years a key target of 
abuse by the occupying army, now face 
violence in the home and profound 
discrimination in public life. Yet women 
must be at the heart of East Timor's 
regeneration. The liberation of the 
women of East Timor will be the real test 
of the country's coming of age. 
East limor: Transition to 
statehood 
CllR April 2000 
ISBN 185287242X 
Price £2.50 + p&p 
from CllR 
UK arms sales 
Avoiding tears before bedtime 
Ian Linden argues for prior scrutiny of 
UK arms sales. 
/There can be few decisions of 
greater potential impact on the 
conduct of foreign relations, and 
on the lives of many people overseas', 
reads the seventh report of the UK 
parliament's Select Committee on 
International Development, 'than 
decisions as to whether to permit weapons 
made in this country to be put into the 
hands of overseas governments and their 
forces'. The question, of course, is who 
makes this decision? 
The answer is complex and opaque. The 
decision to grant a licence under strategic 
export controls can involve four ministries: 
the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI), the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and to a 
small degree the Department for 
International Development (DfID). After 
the decision is taken and the arms 
exported, or not, these ministries combine 
in a quadripartite committee, which reports 
on their oversight of strategic export 
controls in the democratic forum of a 
parliamentary select committee. Only at 
this point, after the event, does public 
accountability and scrutiny take place. 
An 'ethical dimension' to UK foreign 
policy was proclaimed to great fanfares in 
the Foreign Office shortly after Robin Cook 
became foreign secretary. Therefore, 
generally the Foreign Office is in the hot 
seat when licences are challenged on 
ethical grounds. But it is mainly the 
responsibility of the DTI and the Ministry 
of Defence, which have often vigorously 
promoted a particular arms sale, 
sometimes against the better judgement of 
the foreign secretary. Disputes are resolved 
in Downing Street - at the top level of 
government - with employment as the 
highest priority. The foreign secretary 
could, of course, resign when overruled but 
that would lead to a rapid turnover in 
foreign secretaries. These are not in any 
case resigning times in British politics -
pace Mr Mandleson who was pushed and 
did not jump. 
The best the British government and 
the European Union could do on arms 
sales to Indonesia was a four-month 
embargo, running rather shamefully 
behind the United States. The licence 
granted for sale of Hawk aircraft was 
remarkably extended from November 
2000 until 24 March 2001 after the 
embargo was lifted last year. Extraordinary 
licences were given for spare parts for two 
aircraft used by Zimbabwe in the Congo in 
February 2000, in breach of the EU 
embargo on arms sales in the Great Lakes 
war. The 'ethical dimension' tended to 
drop out of Foreign Office parlance as 
pressures for reform grew. 
The 'ethical dimension' has caused the 
British government a great deal of pain. At 
one moment it is out of the question to 
break an existing contractual obligation 
for the sale of arms when human rights 
deteriorate. At the next a government 
representative testifying before the 
quadripartite committee states under 
pressure: 'What we recognise in these 
exceptional circumstances that we have 
been confronted with is the possibility of 
breaking that contractual obligation.' And 
in reply to the indefatigible Ann Clywd 
MP, 'In principle the British government 
could have taken that action 
(cancellation) at any time.' 
There is a simple way out. This is prior 
scrutiny of licences by parliamentary 
representatives carrying, among others, a 
human rights brief, rather than post_ hoc 
scrutiny and the resulting tears before 
bedtime. It has been done in Sweden since 
the mid 1980s and it works. It should be 
done here. A great deal of trouble would 
be avoided. Not to mention 'the lives of 
people overseas' that would be saved. 
• Ian Linden is executive director of CllR. 
Balibo: The truth will out 
On 16October1975- day one of 
Indonesia's invasion of East Timor -
five television newsmen were murdered 
in the border town of Balibo. They were 
New Zealander Gary Cunningham; 
Australians Greg Shackleton and Tony 
Stewart; and Britons Brian Peters and 
Malcolm Rennie. Hugh Dowson and 
Peter Beveridge argue that the UK 
government should follow Australia's 
example by opening its files on the 
affair. 
T
he UN Transitional Authority in 
East Timor (UNTAET) has launched 
an investigation into the Balibo 
murders. In the UK parliament on 7 
November 2000, Foreign Office Minister 
Baroness Scotland welcomed the UN 
investigation. She wants 'the perpetrators 
of these heinous offences to be found'. 
She did not accept, however, that Her 
Majesty's Government should release its 
papers on the case now, five years early. 
Until recently, the Australian govern-
ment claimed the Balibo attack was an 
East Timorese operation, led by Joao 
Tavares of the Timorese Democratic Union 
(UDT) and Tomas Goni;;alves of the 
Timorese Democratic Popular Association 
(Apodeti). Early in 1999, Tavares emerged 
as 'Commander-in-chief' of the pro-
Indonesian militias. Goni;;alves fled East 
Timor in April 1999. He told Australian 
intelligence experts that Yunus Yosfiah 
(then Indonesia's information minister) 
had led the October 1975 attack on Balibo. 
He also warned that the Indonesian mili-
tary (TNI) were planning to disrupt the 
coming independence ballot. 
A report dated January 1999, commis-
sioned by Australia's foreign minister, 
accepted that Yosfiah helped lead the 
Balibo attack and that Indonesian troops 
covered up evidence of their own involve-
ment. But the Australian and British gov-
ernments did nothing. 
In May 1999, Yosfiah admitted leading 
the attack, but denied responsibility for 
the newsmen's deaths. He denied, too, 
that the TNI was undermining the UN 
ballot. Again, there was no action from 
Australia or Britain. 
Australian revelations 
In July 2000 Professor Des Ball (Australia's 
top independent intelligence expert) and 
Hamish McDonald, foreign editor of the 
Sydney Morning Herald, showed h ow the 
Australian government had covered up 
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the Balibo murders. Their book Death in 
Balibo, Lies in Canberra revealed that: 
• the Australian government was told in 
advance by go-betweens for the 
Indonesian military that the latter 
would launch a full-scale invasion of 
East Timar on 15 October 1975; and 
• Australian intelligence had intercepted a 
discussion between two Indonesian 
generals in which they agreed that the 
five television newsmen would be killed. 
The Australian government, in a book pub-
lished in September 2000, Australia and the 
Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timar, 
1974-76, accepted that Australia received 
advance warning of the invasion. But the 
book says nothing about Australia's fore-
knowledge of the murders in Balibo. 
The TNI will continue to expect 
impunity fo r mass-murder until the UK 
government opens its Balibo files , 
including information from MI6 officer in 
Canberra, and allows a judicial inquiry 
into Balibo. Many of those who were 
involved at Balibo are today senior 
Indonesian political or military figures . 
On 30 November 2000, Ann Clwyd MP, 
Valerie Davey MP, and relatives of Malcolm 
Rennie delivered to the FCO letters from 
both British newsmen's families demanding 
that the foreign secretary release all the UK 
government's files on Balibo. 
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A tale of two bishops 
CllR's Catherine Scott reviews the 
contrasting biographies of two East 
Timorese bishops. 
From the Place of the Dead: Bishop 
Belo and the struggle for East Timor, 
by Arnold S. Kohen, Lion Publishing 
PLC, Oxford and St. Martin's Press, 
New York, 398 pages, 1999. 
Fighting Spirit of East Timor: The Life 
of Martinho da Costa Lopes, by 
Rowena Lennox, Pluto Press, Australia 
and Zed Press, London & New York, 
260 pages, 2000. 
Do not be misled by the titles of these biographies: the first bishop is still very much alive, the second, 
dead. The first is feted in international 
circles and holds a Nobel Peace Prize. The 
second died, abandoned by the church he 
served, sad, disillusioned and alone. 
Martinho da Costa Lopes (Apostolic 
Administrator, Dili 1977-83) had the mis-
fortune to go first . Both he and his suc-
cessor, Carlos Felipe Ximenes Belo, were 
conservative churchmen, transformed by 
the extraordinary situation in East Timar 
during the Indonesian occupation. They 
found that in order to be true to them-
selves, they had to put their people - and 
their people's suffering - first, and ecclesi-
astical diplomacy and neutrality second. 
In the process, they ran into opposition 
and pressure from all sides, from the 
church as well as the state. As a result, 
both were forced to tolerate extremes of 
isolation. 
Different approaches 
So much for the similarities between the 
two biographies. Rowena Lennox's task 
was the more difficult. She has written 
about someone whom she never met, re-
creating this account of Martinho da Costa 
Lopes' life with sensitivity and 
imagination, from extensive research and 
many hours of interviews with people who 
did know him personally. 
Arnold Kohen's more expansive text 
about Bishop Carlos Belo, on the other 
hand, is the life story of a great friend, 
someone to whom he has had more access 
than most, and for whom he has worked 
as unofficial external spokesman. From the 
Place of the Dead not only tells the story of 
Bela's life, and supplies a detailed and 
well-informed history of East Timer's 
recent past, it also records 24 years of 
campaigning from the author's own 
perspective as a long-standing US activist. 
It is a valuable account, and shows just 
how directly related Bishop Bela's 
pronouncements were to adjustments in 
the US political establishment. 
The precursor 
Bishop Bela's fame has gone before him, 
especially since 1996, when he was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize (along with 
Jose Ramos Horta) . His role in the story of 
East Timor's liberation has been central, 
and Kohen's account does justice to a 
remarkable individual. Lennox's account 
makes clear how da Costa Lopes set a 
precedent for Belo. 
Should the former have received more 
recognition for his efforts? Perhaps Belo 
was the better politician as well as 
physically tougher, a younger man better 
able to weather the pressure and 
isolation. However, Bishop da Costa 
Lopes did not have recourse to 
international political support in the 
same way as Belo eventually did: the East 
Timorese cause at that time was on 
virtually no one's agenda outside the 
territory. The upsurge of international 
solidarity was still seven years away when 
he was finally forced out of office for his 
outspokenness. 
Love thy neighbour? 
One thing is clear, however. Irrespective 
of the service and obedience they require 
of priests, the Vatican diplomatic 
authorities can be uncaring of their own. 
The Christian exhortation to love thy 
neighbour - something both Bishops 
have preached in an attempt to broker 
reconciliation between rival factions in 
their homeland - does not appear to 
have been applied to Dom Martinho as 
he struggled on his meagre Vatican 
pension in Lisbon, ignored and 
marginalised by the local hierarchy. 
Bishop Belo was lucky to have made a 
personal connection with Pope John Paul 
II during the latter's 1989 visit to East 
Timor. It may well have saved his skin on 
a number of occasions. 
